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Inactivating Anterior Insular Cortex Reduces Risk Taking
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We often have to make risky decisions between alternatives with outcomes that can be better or worse than the outcomes of safer
alternatives. Although previous studies have implicated various brain regions in risky decision making, it remains unknown which
regions are crucial for balancing whether to take a risk or play it safe. Here, we focused on the anterior insular cortex (AIC), the causal
involvement of which in risky decisionmaking is still unclear, although human imaging studies have reported AIC activation in various
gambling tasks.We investigated the effects of temporarily inactivating theAICon rats’ risk preference in two types of gambling tasks, one
in which risk arose in reward amount and one in which it arose in reward delay. As a control within the same subjects, we inactivated the
adjacent orbitofrontal cortex (OFC),which iswell known to affect risk preference. In both gambling tasks,AIC inactivationdecreased risk
preference whereas OFC inactivation increased it. In risk-free control situations, AIC and OFC inactivations did not affect decision
making. These results suggest that the AIC is causally involved in risky decisionmaking and promotes risk taking. The AIC andOFCmay
be crucial for the opposing motives of whether to take a risk or avoid it.
Introduction
The choice of taking a risk for a higher gain or playing it safe and
thereby avoiding a loss is an important one. Risk taking can lead
to ruin but may also prove advantageous by facilitating explora-
tion. The point is their balance. Many behavioral studies have
investigated decisionmaking under risk in humans (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) and animals (for review, see Kacelnik and
Bateson, 1996;Weber et al., 2004) and have shown that decisions
made by a wide variety of species are sensitive to the balance of
risky and sure outcomes.
Recent studies have elucidated the neural basis underlying
decision making under risk (for review, see Doya, 2008; Rush-
worth et al., 2011; Schultz, 2011). A key region is the anterior
insular cortex (AIC). In human neuroimaging studies, the AIC
was activated during decision making under risk in various gam-
bling tasks (Paulus et al., 2003; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;
Preuschoff et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010). For example, insular
activationwas strongerwhen participants chose risky alternatives
versus sure alternatives (Paulus et al., 2003). AIC activity was
correlated with risk prediction and risk prediction error
(Preuschoff et al., 2008), and reflected higher forms of risk (Burke
and Tobler, 2011). However, whether AIC causally contributes to
decision making under risk is largely unknown.
The primary purpose of this study was to test for a causal
involvement of the AIC in decision making under risk by using
reversible pharmacological lesions. We investigated the effect of
temporarily inactivating rat AIC on risk preference in two differ-
ent gambling tasks, one with risky reward amounts, the other
with risky reward delays. We aimed to establish the generality of
the inactivation effects on risk preference beyond a single task.
We also used a control task to dissociate the main findings from
effects on other properties of reward, such as reward delay and
magnitude.
We contrasted AIC inactivations with inactivations of the or-
bitofrontal cortex (OFC) within the same subjects. Patients with
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal area including the OFC
make abnormal risky decisions in the Iowa Gambling task
(Bechara et al., 1994). In humanneuroimaging, theOFCactivates
in various gambling tasks (Rogers et al., 1999b; Ernst et al., 2002;
Fukui et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010). In rats,
OFC-lesions increased preference for risk (Pais-Vieira et al.,
2007). Based on these studies, the OFC has been thought to play
a crucial role for optimal decisionmaking under risk. Our second
purpose was to test the generality of this role in two distinct risk
tasks, one inwhich risk arises in reward amount and one inwhich
it arises in reward delay. Third, we aimed to clarify the functional
differences between adjacentAIC andOFC in risky decisionmak-
ing by using the same experimental procedure and subjects. Such
awithin-subject designwith reversible inactivations andwashout
periods allowed us to tightly control for individual behavioral
differences and minimize compensatory effects resulting from
lesions.
Materials andMethods
Animals. Twenty-four male Wistar rats weighing 200–320 g were used
for the experiments. Rats were individually housed under 12 h light/dark
cycles with light onset at 8:00 P.M. Training and testing took place during
the dark phase. Rats were given ad libitum access to food for the duration
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of the experiments but limited access to drinkingwater becausewaterwas
used as reward for the experiment. To preventweight loss, rats were given
additional water after the daily experiment finished. Their body weights
were monitored daily. Throughout the experiments, animals were
treated in accordance with the National Institutes of HealthGuide for the
Care andUse of LaboratoryAnimals andTohokuUniversityGuidelines for
Animal Care and Use.
Overall structure of the experiment.We investigated the effects of AIC
and OFC inactivation on rats’ decision making in two types of gambling
tasks (the amount and delay gambling task) and intertemporal choice
task (as a control). The basic task for the rat was to get water by choosing
one of two levers that were associated with different outcomes. The rats
learned the basic rules of the tasks in training 1, and were trained to
discriminate the difference in reward amount or delay in training 2 (for
details, see below). Then, we investigated behavioral performances with-
out drug injections in both gambling tasks and in the intertemporal
choice task. Finally, we implanted guide cannulae for drug injections
and, after a recovery period, conducted pharmacological tests in those
same tasks.
Apparatus.Experimentswere conducted in dimly lit sound-attenuated
boxes (60 45 35 cm). On one wall of the box, a nose-poke hole was
located in the center and two levers on each side of the hole. Nose-poke
responses were detected by a horizontal infrared beam (OMRON).
White LEDs were positioned above each lever. A nozzle delivering water
was on the opposite wall. Auditory stimuli were generated by a speaker
located in the ceiling. Each device was connected to a computer via a
Digital I/O card (PCI-7248; ADLINK Technology) and controlled by an
in-house software program (based on C). The boxes were equipped
with a fan for ventilation and masking noise. For details of apparatus
settings, see Figure 1A.
Training 1: Nose-poke and lever press. Training 1 consisted of three
steps. First, rats were trained to press either lever to get water. An audi-
tory stimulus (2 kHz, 1 s) was presented upon lever press and water
delivery followed. Second, rats were trained to press the lever when a
visual stimulus was presented. The visual stimulus also indicated which
lever the rats should press. If the left visual stimulus was presented, the
rats were required to press the left lever (correct case). They could not get
water if they pressed the right lever (wrong case) and were required to
press the left lever again in the next trial. When rats pressed the wrong
lever, the auditory stimulus was not presented. Once a lever was pressed,
visual stimuli disappeared and levers were unavailable until the next trial.
Finally, rats were trained to nose-poke into the central hole to start a trial.
They subsequently pressed one of the available levers and got water from
the nozzle at the opposite wall of the box. If rats did not press any lever
within 10 s after nose-poke, the trial was cancelled and visual stimuli
disappeared until the next trial.
Training 2: Amount and delay discrimination task. Before they were
tested in the amount, delay, or intertemporal choice tasks, rats were
trained to discriminate differences in either amount or time. The amount
discrimination task consisted of a choice between four and two drops of
water, the delay discrimination task consisted of a choice between no
delay and 1.5 s delay. In both discrimination tasks, a session consisted of
40 forced choices for learning the relationship between levers and out-
comes and 100 free choices for measuring rats’ ability to discriminate. In
the first 40 forced-choice trials, available levers were limited to one on
each trial. Rats experienced the two options equally often. In the follow-
ing 100 free-choice trials, both levers were available, and rats could
choose between the two options. Assignment of outcomes to levers was
counterbalanced between sessions. Sessions were conducted up to three
times a day and lasted3 h. A rat was moved to the next step (gambling
task) when it had performed 10 or more consecutive sessions in which
they chose the better option 65% of the time. In both discrimination
tasks, rats chose the better option in85% of the time in most sessions.
Trial structure. In both discrimination tasks, a 1 s period was provided
after the lever press asmoving time; that is, water was delivered at least 1 s
after the lever press. The duration of delay was implemented after this 1 s
moving time. The auditory stimulus was presented during lever press
when water was given. In the amount discrimination task, one drop of
water was 50 l, and the interval between each drop was 700 ms. Dura-
tion of the delay was 3 s. In the delay discrimination task, rats were given
100 l of water per trial.
Depending on the experimental task inwhich they later were used, rats
were tested in the amount, delay, or both discrimination tasks. Thus, the
nine (10, 5) rats that were used in the amount gambling (delay gambling,
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Figure 1. Task design. A, Experimental apparatus. B, Sequence of events in a trial of the amount gambling task (top) and delay gambling task (bottom). The rats were required to nose-poke to
initiate a trial, and then to press a lever. Water was given as reward. Both tasks required the rats to choose between a risky option and a sure option. C, Session structure. In the first 40 forced trials,
the rats learned the relationship between the lever positions and the outcomes. In the following 100 free choice trials, the rats were free to choose between the two options.
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intertemporal choice) task had been tested for their amount (delay,
amount and delay) discrimination ability in the amount (delay, both)
discrimination task.
Amount and delay gambling tasks. Risk can arise from variability in
reward amount or delay (Logan, 1965; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996). In
the present study, we investigated the effects of AIC or OFC inactivation
on risky decisionmaking associated with reward amount and delay using
two gambling tasks (the amount gambling task and the delay gambling
task), which were modified from previously described procedures (Lo-
gan, 1965). In both tasks, water-deprived rats were required to choose
and press one of two levers for water as reward (Fig. 1A,B). In the
amount gambling task, rats were required to choose between a risky
option (variable amount: 4 drops or no water, 50/50 chance) and a sure
option (fixed amount: x drops of water; x  1, 2, 3, 4; x was fixed in a
session). In the delay gambling task, ratswere required to choose between
a risky option (variable delay until reward delivery: 0 or 10 s, 50/50
chance) and a sure option (fixed delay: x 0, 1.5, 3, 5, 10 s, xwas fixed in
a session; Fig. 1B). The overall task designs and procedures in the two
gambling tasks were the same as in the amount and delay discrimination
tasks.
Before we conducted pharmacological experiments, we investigated
behavioral performance without drug injections at each x in both gam-
bling tasks. More than 12 sessions were conducted at each level of x.
Percent choice of the risky option in each individual was the average of 10
sessions selected from the last consecutive 12 sessions, eliminating the
two sessions with maximum and minimum percent choice of the risky
option. Subjective equivalence points between risky and sure options
(percent choice of the risky option  50%) were calculated based on
logistic sigmoid functions that were fitted to the observed value using the
least-square method.
Intertemporal choice task. If inactivation of either the AIC or OFC
disrupted the recognition of the difference in reward amount or delay, or
affected value processing under sure conditions, percent choice of the
risky option could have been affected in the amount and delay gambling
tasks. To test this possibility, we investigated the effect of AIC or OFC
inactivation in an intertemporal choice task. In this task, rats were re-
quired to choose between a larger later option and a smaller sooner
option. This task has been used previously in delay discounting studies
(Cardinal et al., 2001; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008), and our experi-
mental design was modified from the one described by Evenden and
Ryan (1996). If AIC or OFC inactivation affects either discrimination or
evaluation of reward amount or delay, percent choice of the two options
would change in this task. The larger later option provided four drops of
water after a delay of x seconds (x 0, 3, 5, 7, 10; xwas fixed in a session).
The smaller sooner option provided two drops of water immediately.
The overall task design and experimental procedures were the same as
in the amount and delay gambling tasks. We calculated the subjective
equivalence point between larger later and smaller sooner options by
using the same methods as in the two gambling tasks.
Surgery.After the rats were tested for their behavioral performances in
the amount gambling task, delay gambling task, or intertemporal choice
task, they were surgically implanted with stainless steel guide cannulae
(0.6 mm diameter) targeting 1 mm above bilateral AIC (AP 3.0, ML
4.2, DV 5.6 mm) and OFC (AP 4.4, ML 2.2, DV 5.0 mm).
Under ketamine (80.0 mg/kg) and xylazine (0.8 mg/kg) anesthesia, the
scalp was retracted, and craniotomies were made bilaterally above the
target sites of the cannulae. Four guide cannulae (0.6mmdiameter) were
inserted and fixed with dental cement. To prevent clogging by blood
clots, dummy injection cannulae (0.3 mm diameter) were inserted into
the guide cannulae. Rats were given 1 week of recovery after the surgery.
After the recovery period, they were retrained in either the amount or
delay discrimination task in a week. In the retraining period, rats were
handled 30 min before each session to get them acclimatized to the pro-
cedure of drug injection.
Drugs. Either the AIC orOFCwas inactivated by injecting amixture of
muscimol (GABA A receptor agonist) and baclofen (GABA B receptor
agonist) (Sigma), which have been used in previous inactivation studies
(Ghods-Sharifi et al., 2009; Takahashi et al., 2009). Muscimol and
baclofen were dissolved separately in physiological saline at a concentra-
tion of 200 ng/l, and combined in equal volumes. The final concentra-
tion of each drug was 100 ng/l. The concentration of drugs was
determined by referring to previous studies (Ghods-Sharifi et al., 2009;
Horst and Laubach, 2009; Takahashi et al., 2009) and our preliminary
experiment. The volume of drugs was 100 nl per hemisphere. We used
lower drug volumes than in the previous studies to prevent diffusion
between AIC and OFC, which adjoin each other. To test the extent of
drug diffusion, we conducted additional tests in which two types of dye
were injected into the AIC andOFC, using the same injection procedures
as themain experiment. As smallermolecules are generallymore likely to
diffuse (Hayduk and Laudie, 1974), we used thionine and pontamine sky
blue, whose molecular weight was relatively close to and larger than that
of the drugs, respectively (muscimol: 114.1, baclofen: 213.66, thionine:
263.75, pontamine sky blue: 992.8). Despite the difference in molecular
weight, the extents of diffusion of the two dyes were both 1.5 mm in
width. Edeline et al. (2002) report a similar extent of diffusion after the
same amount of muscimol injection into the cortex. Importantly, there
was no overlap between injection sites.
Injection procedure. Drug or saline was injected 30 min before the
behavioral tests. During the drug injection, rats were handled on the
experimenter’s lap without anesthesia. The dummy cannula was re-
moved from the implanted guide cannula, and the injection cannula was
inserted into the target region via the guide cannula. The injection can-
nulae were stainless steel needles 0.3 mm in diameter and extending 1
mm from the tip of the guide cannulae. Injection cannulae were con-
nected to a microliter Hamilton syringe by 0.26-mm-diameter polyeth-
ylene tubing. The drug or saline was delivered at a rate of 50 nl/min for 2
min (100 nl per hemisphere) under syringe infusion pump control. In-
jection cannulae were left in place for 1 min after injection to allow
diffusion of the fluid. Injections to each hemisphere were performed
separately; the entire injection procedure took 7–10 min. Finally, we
checked for clogging of the injection cannula after the injection. Data
were excluded from the analysis if the injection cannula were clogged. To
habituate the rats to the injection procedure, they underwent a mock
injection during preinjection sessions (the last 5 sessions before injection
conditions).
Pharmacological test schedule. Each rat underwent four injection con-
ditions (AIC/drugs, AIC/saline, OFC/drugs, and OFC/saline in a ran-
domized order). All injections were spaced at least 2 d apart. We treated
the last five preinjection sessions as a baseline. The averages of the stan-
dard deviations of the risky choices in the last five preinjection sessions
were 11.1% in the amount gambling task, 10.1% in the delay gambling
task, and 10.4% in the intertemporal choice task.
Histology. After experiments were completed, the brains were sliced
into 50 m coronal sections and stained with thionine. Slices were ex-
amined under a microscope to identify locations of cannulae. Cannulae
placements were classified using the rat brain atlas (Paxinos andWatson,
2007).
Data analysis. Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS and Mi-
crosoft Excel. In both the amount and the delay gambling task, four
behavioral parameters were measured for each animal: percent choice of
the risky option in 100 free choices, correct rate in 40 forced choices,
average reaction time in 100 free choices, and number of reaction omis-
sions in the whole session.
The population’s percent choice of the risky option was the average
percent choice of the risky option of all individuals. Comparisons be-
tween percent choice of the risky option and chance level (50%, random
choice between the two options) were made by one-sample t test (signif-
icance level: p  0.05). To calculate the subjective equivalence point
between the risky and sure options (percent choice of the risky option
50%), a logistic sigmoid function ( f(x) a b/(1 exp ((x c)/d);
a, b, c, and d were free parameters) was fitted to the observed choice
frequencies using the least-squares method.
For the analysis of the injection conditions, first we compared the
percent choices of the risky option between the pharmacological treat-
ment session (postinjection) with the average of the last five sessions
before injection (preinjection), and one session conducted on the day
after postinjection (recovery). Comparisons of percent choice of the risky
option between preinjection, postinjection, and recoveryweremade using a
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one-way ANOVA. If the outcome of this ANOVA yielded significant effects
at the p 0.05 level, a post hoc t test with Bonferroni correction was per-
formed (significance level: p 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected). The changes
in the percent of risky option choice from preinjection to postinjection
(the percent of risky option in postinjection minus that of preinjection)
were compared between the drug and saline injection conditions on an
individual animal basis by paired t test (significance level: p 0.05).
Comparisons of the correct rate between drugs and saline injection
were made by nonparametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test (significant
level: p 0.05). A nonparametric test was used because the correct rate
was extremely high and not normally distributed. Comparisons of reac-
tion time and reaction omission between the drugs and saline injection
were made by paired t tests (significant level: p 0.05).
In the intertemporal choice task, data collection and analysis was per-
formed as in the two gambling tasks. Comparisons of percent choice of
the larger later option between preinjection, postinjection, and recovery
sessions were made using one-way ANOVA.
Data were excluded from the analysis when the injection cannulae
were found to be clogged or when the tip of the injection cannulae devi-
ated from the target region with histological investigation (Fig. 3B, x
symbol). The final numbers for each injection condition were nine for
every experiment in the amount gambling task and nine (AIC/drugs), six
(AIC/saline), seven (OFC/drugs), and six (OFC/saline) in the delay gam-
bling task. Note that the results remained significant when all data were
included.
Results
Behavior in two gambling tasks
Figure 2, A and B, show behavioral performance in the amount
(N  9) and delay (N  10) gambling tasks, respectively. We
focus on two aspects of these results here. One aspect is whether
the rats understood the difference between risky and sure op-
tions. In both tasks, percent choice of the risky option changed
gradually (not abruptly) depending on the value of the sure op-
tion. This result suggests that the rats were attracted not only to
either outcome of the risky and sure options, but compared the
three outcomes provided by the two options (i.e., they were sen-
sitive to changes in the sure amount).
Next, we asked which option the rats preferred when the risky
and sure option had the same expected value in the two gambling
tasks. Risky and sure options had the same expected value at x
2 in the amount gambling task and at x 5 in the delay gambling
task. Because each option, on average, provides the same reward
amount or delay at these conditions, rats with no preference for
either optionwould choose the risky option in50%of the trials.
In the amount gambling task, six of nine rats exhibited a signifi-
cant preference for the risky option at x 2 (risk-seeking type),
and the other three rats had no significant preference (risk-
indifferent type). In the population, the percent choice of the
risky option was significantly higher than chance level (60.5 
3.1%, t(9) 7.67, p 0.05). In the delay gambling task, all 10 rats
exhibited a preference for the risky option at x 5 (84.1 2.1%,
t(10) 16.14, p 0.05). These behavioral tendencies in both tasks
are consistent with previous reports that in general, animals ex-
hibit various preferences for risk in reward amount and prefer
risk in reward delay when risky and sure options have the same
expected value (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996; Weber et al., 2004).
To allow risk preference to change by inactivations, we inves-
tigated the x value at which risky and sure options were equiva-
lent for the rats (percent choice of the risky option  50%,
subjective equivalence point) by drawing sigmoid curves based
on logistic functions that were fitted to the observed value (r2
0.99 in both tasks). The subjective equivalence point between the
risky and sure option was 2.4 in the amount gambling task and
2.3 in the delay gambling task. In the following experiments, the
rats were tested for risk preference at x 2 in the amount gam-
bling task because this was the nearest integer number to the
subjective equivalence point, and at their respective subjective
equivalence point in the delay gambling task because delays could
be adjusted precisely to individual subjective equivalence points.
Inactivation of AIC and OFC in gambling tasks
The ratswere implantedwith cannulae for localmicroinjection of
drugs. Figure 3 shows guide and injection cannulae tracks and
injection sites. In Figure 4, A and B, the effects of inactivation of
the AIC and OFC on risk preference are shown as group data.
Changes in percent choice of the risky option between preinjec-
tion, postinjection, and recovery were detected with a one-way
ANOVA and further specified by post hoc t tests with Bonferroni
correction. Saline injection into either the AIC or OFC did not
affect risk preference in either gambling task (amount gambling
task: AIC, p 0.69; OFC, p 0.66; delay gambling task: AIC, p
0.66; OFC, p 0.86; one-way ANOVA). In contrast, inactivation
by muscimol and baclofen injection changed risk preferences.
The direction of change was similar for both tasks but different
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Figure 2. Percent choice of the risky option in the amount (A,N 9) and delay (B,N 10)
gambling tasks. Sigmoid curves were drawn based on logistic functions that were fitted to
observed values (r 2 0.99 in both tasks). When the risky and sure options had the same
expected value (x 2 in the amount gambling task, x 5 in the delay gambling task), rats
significantly preferred the risky option ( p 0.05, both tasks). Calculated from sigmoid logistic
functions, the subjective equivalence points between risky and sure options were 2.4 in the
amount gambling task and 2.3 in the delay gambling task. Error bars indicate SEM.
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depending on injection site. Inactivation of the AIC decreased
risk preferencewhereas inactivation of theOFC increased it (one-
way ANOVA, all p  0.05; post hoc t test with preinjection vs
postinjection at each drug injection condition, Bonferroni-
corrected, all p  0.05). There were no differences in inactivation
effects on risk preference between risk-seeking and risk-indifferent
rats in the amount gambling task.
We also analyzed the changes in risk preference on the single-
subject level. Figure 4C shows the individual changes in percent
choice of the risky option from preinjection to postinjection (i.e.,
percent choice of the risky option postinjection minus that of
preinjection). Risk preference changes induced by drug injection
differed significantly from saline injection (all p 0.05, paired t
test with drugs vs saline).Thus, AIC or OFC inactivation also had
distinct effects on risk taking at the single-subject level, regardless
of whether risk was in amount or delay.
To test whether the risk preferences developed over the 100
free-choice trials, we compared the percent choices of the risky
option for each injection condition by dividing the free-choice
trials into four blocks. There were no significant differences in
risky choices between blocks [all p 0.1, repeated-measures two-
way ANOVA (drugs/saline blocks)], and interactions between
drugs/saline and blocks were not significant either (however, the
p value of the interaction between drugs/saline and blocks inOFC
injections in the amount gambling task
was 0.06). Thus, there was no significant
development of the risk preference during
a session.
Control analysis: less specific effects of
AIC or OFC inactivation?
Prefrontal cortex is thought to be involved
in cognition, motor performance, and at-
tention (Fuster, 2008). We therefore inves-
tigated whether AIC and OFC inactivation
affected performance in domains other
than risk taking.More specifically, we com-
pared three behavioral parameters after
muscimol and baclofen injection versus sa-
line injection: correct rate in forced
choices (cognition), reaction time (dura-
tion from nose-poke to lever press) in free
choices (motor performance), and num-
ber of reaction omissions (no lever press
in 10 s after nose-poke) in the whole ses-
sion (attention) (Table 1).
Forced choice required pressing a speci-
fied lever to get a reward, but rats could also
press a nonspecified lever (for no reward).
Thecorrect rate in forcedchoicescouldhave
been affected by various cognitive dysfunc-
tions, butAIC andOFC inactivation hadno
significant effect in either the amount gam-
bling task (AIC: z1.41, p 0.16, OFC:
z1.0, p 0.32, Wilcoxon signed ranks
test) or the delay gambling task (AIC: z 0,
p  1.0, OFC: z  0, p  1.0, Wilcoxon
signed ranks test).
Although there was a possibility that
muscimol and baclofen injection might
affect motor performance by leaking to
the secondary motor area through the
guide cannulae, there were no significant
differences in reaction time between saline and drug injection
into either the AIC or OFC in the amount gambling task (AIC:
p 0.07, OFC: p 0.59, paired t test) or the delay gambling task
(AIC: p 0.15, OFC: p 0.75, paired t test).
Reaction omission could result from a deficit in attention.
However, reaction omissions rarely happened in any of the 140
trials even with drug injections. There were no significant differ-
ences in the number of reaction omissions between saline and
drug injection into either the AIC or OFC in either the amount
gambling task (AIC: p 0.07, OFC: p 0.14, paired t test) or the
delay gambling task (AIC: p 0.22, OFC: p 0.20, paired t test).
Control experiment: intertemporal choice task
To test whether inactivation of the AIC and OFC affected the
recognition of the difference in reward amount or delay, or value
processing under sure conditions, we investigated the effect of
AIC and OFC inactivation in the intertemporal choice task. Fig-
ure 5A shows the behavioral performance in the intertemporal
choice task (N  5). In the same way as for the two gambling
tasks, we calculated the subjective equivalence point between
larger later and smaller sooner options for each individual (x 
5–7), and conducted pharmacological experiments at these
points. Figure 5B shows that there were no significant effects on
intertemporal choice by AIC andOFC inactivation (p 0.56 and
OFC AIC
AIVLO
AID
DI
GI
Fr3
M1M2
Cg1
PrL
LOVO
AIV
AID
M2
Cg1
PrL
AIV
LO
VO AID
M2
Cg1
VO LO
DLO
AIV
LO
AID
DI
Fr3
M1M2
Cg1
PrL
VO LO AIV
AID
DI
+ 4.2
+ 2.6
+ 3.0
+ 4.6
+ 3.8
+ 3.4
: OFC             Red: Amount gambling task
: AIC             Green: Delay gambling task
: Out of traget region            Blue: Intertemporal choice task
A
B
Figure 3. Locations of injection. Rats were bilaterally implanted with 0.6-mm-diameter guide cannulae through which 0.3-
mm-diameter injection cannulae were inserted. A, Typical tracks of guide and injection cannulae. B, Locations of tip of injection
cannulae in the AIC and OFC. Plates are adaptations from the atlas of the rat brain (Paxinos and Watson, 2007). AID, Dorsal
agranular insular cortex; AIV, ventral agranular insular cortex; DI, dysgranular insular cortex; DLO, dorsolateral orbitofrontal cortex;
GI, granular insular cortex; LO, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; VO, ventral orbitofrontal cortex.
Ishii et al. • Anterior Insular Cortex in Risky Decision Making J. Neurosci., November 7, 2012 • 32(45):16031–16039 • 16035
p 0.81, respectively, ANOVA) and by saline injection (p 0.56
and p 0.51, respectively, ANOVA).
It is possible that inactivations affected the value processing of
amount and delay in opposite ways such that they canceled out. If
so, AIC and OFC inactivations would affect the discrimination
performances in the amount and delay discrimination tasks.
However, our initial preliminary experiments confirmed that
AIC andOFC inactivations have no effect on discrimination per-
formance in each discrimination task, so this possibility seems
unlikely.
Discussion
Previous studies have found various neural correlates of decision
making under risk, such as the amygdala, nucleus accumbens,
cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and insular cortex (Mc-
Coy and Platt, 2005; Tom et al., 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2009;
Mohr et al., 2010). In the present study, we focused on the causal
roles of two limbic regions, AIC and OFC. In two different types
of gambling tasks, we found that inactivation of the AIC de-
creased risk preferencewhereas inactivation of theOFC increased
risk preference. Because the effects of these inactivations were
similar for both tasks, inactivations appear to have affected risk
processing generally and directly rather than affecting more spe-
cific reward-amount and delay-value processing or having indi-
rect effects. This interpretation is supported by the result of the
control experiment suggesting that AIC and OFC inactivations
had no significant effects on intertemporal choice. The AIC and
OFC seem to be important for decision making under risky con-
ditions and not always necessary for value-based decisionmaking
under sure conditions. In addition, AIC and OFC inactivations
had no significant effects on less specific factors of task perfor-
mance, such as correct rate, reaction time, or reaction omission.
Based on these results, we propose that inactivation of either AIC
orOFC primarily changed risk preference.Most importantly, the
change occurred in opposing directions for the two regions.
Intact AIC promotes risk taking
Previous human imaging studies have reported AIC activation in
risky decisionmaking (Paulus et al., 2003; Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Burke and Tobler,
2011). Here, we demonstrated a causal involvement of the AIC in
risky decision making, and, by extension, suggest that the intact
AIC normally promotes risk taking. This idea concurs with pre-
vious findings that insular activation was stronger when partici-
pants took risky versus sure decisions (Paulus et al., 2003) and
that high insula activation was more likely to occur when partic-
ipants took a risky decision after taking a no-risk decision in the
previous trial (Xue et al., 2010).
The findingsofAIC involvement indrugaddictionare consistent
with our results of AIC inactivation.Damage to the insula disrupted
addiction to cigarette smoking (Naqvi et al., 2007). Insula inactiva-
tion prevented amphetamine-seeking in a place-preference task
(Contreras et al., 2007). From these observations, theAIC is thought
to induce an urge for the pleasurable interoceptive effects of drug
taking (Naqvi et al., 2007). However, drugs are risky substances,
often leading not only to pleasurable but adverse effects. Together
with our findings, theAICmay promote risk seeking in situations in
which both positive and negative outcomes can ensue.More gener-
ally, the AIC has been implicated as a key structure in linkingmulti-
sensory information, affective processing, and previous experiences
throughconnectionswith theposterior insular cortex, theamygdala,
and the hippocampal system (Shi and Cassell, 1998; Delatour and
Witter, 2002; Reynolds and Zahm, 2005; Craig, 2009). Given these
interactions, the AICmay process risk information by using intero-
ceptive and emotional information, and may promote seeking the
better outcome of a risky decision.
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The AIC may also suppress avoiding the worse outcome of a
risky decision. In our study, risk preference after losing the gam-
ble in the previous trial decreased by AIC inactivation in both
gambling tasks (both p 0.05, paired t test with preinjection vs
postinjection): with AIC inactivation, the rats were more risk-
averse, particularly after losing than with saline. This result indi-
cates that theAIC is also involved in adjusting current behavior in
the light of adverse outcomes in risky decisions. Our proposal
that the AIC promotes risk taking appears to be at odds with a
previous idea that the AIC is involved in loss aversion in risky
decisionmaking: high AIC activation preceded switching to risk-
aversive choices in a financial decisionmaking task (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005). This contradiction may be resolved if the AIC is
sensitive to the potentially worse outcome of the risky option and
is recruited to suppress risk avoiding.
TheAICmay promote risk seeking in synergywith other brain
regions. One of these regions is the amygdala. Both the basolat-
eral and the central nucleus receive strong excitatory inputs from
the insular cortex (McDonald, 1998). Moreover, temporary in-
activation of the basolateral amygdala made animals more risk-
averse (Ghods-Sharifi et al., 2009). Thus, it is conceivable that the
intact AIC contributes to and combines with amygdala-mediated
risk seeking.
Opposite roles of AIC and OFC in risky decision making
In this study, we also confirmed that the OFC plays a crucial role in
decision making under risk in the two gambling tasks. Consistent
with previous reports on patients with OFC damage (Bechara et al.,
1994; Rogers et al., 1999a) andOFC-lesioned rodents (Pais-Vieira et
al., 2007), inactivation of the OFC increased risk preference in the
present study. The common effects in both amount and delay gam-
bling tasks extend theprevious literatureby showingageneral roleof
the OFC in risk processing.
At first, our finding that OFC inactivation had no effect on
intertemporal choice may appear inconsistent with findings of
previous studies that rat OFC lesions result in more impulsive
choices (Mobini et al., 2002), less impulsive choices (Winstanley
et al., 2004), or both (Mar et al., 2011). One reason could be that
the time delay setting used for the larger later option in our study
(10 s) was much shorter than the ones used in these previous
studies (30–60 s), making the task less sensitive to impulsivity
caused by OFC inactivation. Thus, the effect of OFC inactivation
on impulsivitymight have gone undetected in our study. In other
words, our study distinguished the effects of OFC inactivation on
risk preference from those on time discounting.
In agreement with the suggested role of the intact OFC in
promoting risk aversion, previous studies revealed an involve-
ment of theOFC in risk processing. Single neurons of the primate
OFC responded to stimuli predicting risk and these responses
increased monotonically with risk (O’Neill and Schultz, 2010).
The responses of rat OFC neurons to the outcomes of risky op-
tions in free choice reflected individual risk preference (Roitman
and Roitman, 2010). The OFCmay contribute to loss processing
because human lateral OFC was activated by monetary loss
(O’Doherty et al., 2001) and activation of lateral OFC covaried
with risk and individual risk aversion (Tobler et al., 2007). From
these observations, it is reasonable to assume that the loss of OFC
Table 1. No effect on other behaviors by either AIC or OFC inactivation
AIC OFC
Saline Mus Bac Saline Mus Bac
Amount gambling task
Correct rate in 40 forced choices (%) 100 0 99.8 0.1 ns 100 0 99 0.9 0.1 ns
Reaction time in 100 free choices (ms) 1260 274 1560 125 ns 1116 156 1174 91 ns
Number of reaction omission in whole session 0.56 0.18 1.56 0.50 ns 0.44 0.18 1.00 0.29 ns
Delay gambling task
Correct rate in 40 forced choices (%) 100 0 100 0 ns 100 0 100 0 ns
Reaction time in 100 free choices (ms) 1027 63 1356 190 ns 1019 48 1001 86 ns
Number of reaction omission in whole session 0.33 0.21 1.42 0.48 ns 1.17 0.48 0.67 0.33 ns
The effects of AIC or OFC inactivation on three behavioral parameters: correct rate in 40 forced choices, reaction time in 100 free choices, and number of reaction omissions in thewhole session. Therewere no significant differences between
inactivations and saline in both gambling tasks, suggesting that inactivations affected performance in risk taking and not other domains. Values are mean SEM. Mus Bac, muscimol baclofen; ns, not significant.
Intertemporal choice task
Recovery
Mus+Bac
Saline
Recovery
Mus+Bac
Saline
Recovery
Recovery
Pre-injection
Pre-injection
Pre-injection
Pre-injection
AIC OFC
100
50
0
 Mus: muscimol    Bac: baclofen
P
er
ce
nt
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 la
rg
er
 la
te
r o
pt
io
n 
(%
)
100
50
0
P
er
ce
nt
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 la
rg
er
 la
te
r o
pt
io
n 
(%
)
0
Duration of delay in larger later option (s)
5 10
A
B
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function interferes with optimal decision making under risk and
causes abnormal risk seeking behavior.
Our results provide new insights into not only the role of the
AIC but also functional specialization between the two adjacent
cortical areas in risky decision making. Anatomically, the AIC
and OFC have distinct topographical connectivity with the stria-
tum and the frontal cortex. Concerning striatal connectivity, the
AIC mainly projects to ventral and lateral parts of the striatum,
whereas the OFC projects more dorsally and medially (Schilman
et al., 2008). Concerning frontal connectivity, the AIC has major
interconnections with the anterior cingulate, prelimbic, and in-
fralimbic cortex, whereas the OFC is mainly interconnected with
the anterior cingulate cortex and has much less interconnection
with prelimbic and infralimbic cortex (Hoover andVertes, 2011).
The important point of our results is that AIC and OFC inactiva-
tions had opposite effects on risk preference, and this suggests, to
our knowledge for the first time, that the AIC and OFC make
different contributions to risky decisions. It could be that the AIC
promotes exploration for possible gain, whereas the OFC pro-
motes avoidance of possible loss. Moreover, there is a possibility
that in the decision phase the AIC and OFC may functionally
compete with each other directly or indirectly. Mutually inhibi-
tory interaction between the AIC and OFC could be achieved by
anatomical interconnection between them (Van De Werd and
Uylings, 2008). Indirect competition could be achieved by oppo-
site influences on other regions that receive projections from
bothAIC andOFC.One such candidate is the nucleus accumbens
(Reynolds and Zahm, 2005), which is also known to be involved
in decisionmaking under risk (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Tom
et al., 2007). Future combinations of inactivation and electro-
physiological studies may help to reveal the functional relation-
ships between the AIC and the OFC.
Conclusion
We show that AIC inactivation decreases risk preference in the
presently used amount and delay gambling tasks. By contrast,
OFC inactivation increases risk preference in these tasks. Within
the same subjects, we confirm and expand previous findings re-
gardingOFC in risky decisionmaking, and distinguish the role of
the AIC from that of the OFC; by implication, the intact AIC
promotes risk taking whereas the intact OFC promotes risk aver-
sion. The relative strength of AIC and OFC activities may impact
whether we take a risk or avoid it.
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